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Richard J. Aldrich 
 
 
'Even had I wanted to…' :   
Intelligence and Special Operations in the Falklands Campaign 
 
 
Lawrence Freedman has produced a balanced, well-researched and meticulous account of 
the Falklands Campaign. It combines scholarship with a lightness of touch. Official 
history can be - and often is - associated with ponderousness. There is no danger of that 
here, for the two volumes are tightly written and constitute an enjoyable read. Freedman's 
long-term interest in this campaign means that he has interviewed most of the key 
participants, even those who died before he undertook this official commission.1 
However, official history is also associated with notions of 'screening' and security 
vetting prior to publication. Where secret service is concerned, official history has 
sometimes constituted an instrument with which the authorities have sought to 'police the 
past'.2 Accordingly this essay sets out to explore just what these volumes can tell us about 
the treacherous landscape of intelligence and special operations.  
 
 
Intelligence and the Falklands Campaign 
What was Lawrence Freedman allowed to see, and what was he permitted to tell? 
Conversely, what was excised by the trembling hand of the Cabinet Office? Addressing 
this question in his preface, he glosses over the exact nature of the material made 
available to him, referring only to 'a range of delicate and sensitive sources'. Certainly he 
saw a great deal of Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) material, probably a range of 
GCHQ material and SIS reports, and in some cases specific intercepts, particularly 
insofar as they informed strategy and operations. However, one also senses a general 
aversion to the subject. 'Even had I wanted to', he observes, 'it would have been 
impossible to provide a comprehensive declassified evaluation of the performance of the 
intelligence community, or even credit many of the contributions' (vol.II, xxiii.).  
 Accordingly, Freedman's open engagement with the subject of intelligence has real 
limits. The author has drawn his own common sense remit that focuses on intelligence 
insofar as it impacted directly upon the campaign. In this respect Freedman moves in the 
spirit of previous official histories, notably Harry Hinsley's magisterial official history of 
British intelligence during the Second World War. This also emphasised intelligence 'in 
context', exploring its significance for major decisions, rather than pursuing the subject 
for its own sake. Inevitably, this will not please the trainspotting aficionados of the world 
of intelligence studies, but it has to be said that even as a contextual approach the 
intelligence dimension of the Falklands campaign seems lightly sketched. 
 
Does the intelligence picture offered by Freedman change our view of the more salient 
issues? Not a great deal, but this volume has at least three significant things to say. First, 
Freedman concurs with the government's view that intelligence warning was largely 
absent. When the Argentine invasion took place in early April 1982, neither British nor 
American intelligence realised this was about to happen. At the same time surprise was 
not total. There was a growing sense that something was being prepared, although the 
general impression was that no action would be taken until perhaps the autumn of 1982. 
In short, on this matter, Freedman supports the findings of the Franks Enquiry of 1983. 
One of the most closely guarded secrets in the early stages of the conflict was how little 
intelligence the British had on the Argentinean order of battle. We depended on a British 
naval officer who collected information on the Argentinean forces as a hobby (vol.II, 
p.70). 
 
Secondly, and perhaps most striking, is the revelation that Margaret Thatcher was 
somewhat in the dark about the sinking of the Belgrano. Latterly, Thatcher was severely 
criticised for permitting the attack on the Argentine cruiser outside the British-imposed 
exclusion zone. It now seems that key intelligence concerning this most controversial 
action of the Falklands campaign reached British commanders and politicians in London 
after the fact. Events turned largely upon a sequence of Argentine navy signals that were 
intercepted and read. On 1 May 1982, the Argentine navy was told to find the British task 
force around the Falklands and launch a 'massive attack' as soon as possible. The cruiser 
Belgrano, which was then sailing outside the exclusion zone to the north, was ordered 
south. This signal to the Belgrano was intercepted by British intelligence. Shortly 
afterwards the War Cabinet met at Chequers and approved a military request to changing 
the rules of engagement and authorise an attack on the Belgrano, although she still lay 
outside the exclusion zone.  
 
Later on, other intercepted signals demonstrated that the Argentineans had been ordered 
to reverse course and resume their previous positions, probably because they had been 
observed by British aircraft. However, this new intelligence material was 'not distributed 
on the British side until the next day' and so had no impact on the day’s events. 
Accusations were later made that Thatcher chose this action to 'torpedo' an American-
backed Peruvian peace plan. It is now clear that the Belgrano was sunk for naval rather 
than political reasons (vol.II, pp.285, 290). 
 
Thirdly, this study sheds new light on the issues of the Falklands aftermath. An entire 
chapter is devoted to the Franks Enquiry, which looked at a range of issues including 
intelligence, and the lack of warning of the original invasion.3  It seems Franks had to 
fight valiantly to get substantive discussion of the JIC into his report, something which 
Whitehall repeatedly asked to have excised. This was a typically ludicrous manifestation 
of the hyper-secret Thatcher era, since the JIC had been frequently discussed in the press 
by 1983. More shocking is the revelation that Franks seems to have been 'nobbled' in 
assessing the performance of the intelligence community during the outbreak of the 
Falklands conflict. Lord Frank's committee accepted the findings of a pre-existing review 
of this subject, conducted by a senior member of the intelligence community. Even the 
Cabinet Office at the time thought the submission of this pre-packaged material was odd, 
noting that it was 'ex post facto' and even had perhaps a 'whiff of exculpation about it'. In 
short, Freedman largely agrees with the analysis offered by Franks, but has some doubts 
about the process (vol.II, pp.720-1).   
 
 
The Falklands and the British Intelligence Community 
The most striking intelligence aspect of this study is what is missing. Unsurprisingly, 
perhaps, Roberto Calvi, a banker who aided a global effort to procure Exocets for the 
Argentineans and ended up under Waterloo Bridge, is conspicuously absent from the 
index.4 More disappointing however is Freedman's unnecessary difficulty with words 
like 'sigint' and 'intercepts'. It is noticeable that the only significant discussion of 
'intercepts' occurs in the account of the Belgrano, where they help to clear the 
government of wrongdoing. It is not permitted anywhere else. The Cabinet Office, it 
seems, has lost none of its taste for the political use of intelligence. Moreover, the general 
coyness about sigint is unnecessary since much is now in the public domain. For 
example, since 1997 we have known that HMS Endurance was in fact a sigint platform. 
In the words of her own captain, Nick Barker, the ship was a 'listening station' while the 
Spanish-speaking operators were known by the rest of the ship's company as 'the Spies'. 
Barker adds, 'they were invaluable during the conflict' - again we will not read of this in 
Freedman.5
 
Does the absence of the sigint story really matter? For those interested in the significant 
impact of the Falklands on the British intelligence community, or upon Anglo-American 
relations, it probably does. The Falklands was the catalyst for 'Zircon', the UK's ill-fated 
experiment with an independent sigint satellite system in the mid-1980s. During the 
Falklands War, American defence and intelligence agencies had certainly been helpful. 
The National Security Agency had allowed the re-targeting of one of its powerful sigint 
satellites for a few hours each day and handed the take over to GCHQ. After some 
argument, imagery satellites had also been diverted at considerable financial cost (their 
operational lives were shortened). American intelligence assisted in the precise location 
of many Argentinean units. However, this episode also illuminated a dangerous over-
dependency on American satellite technology. By 1983, the supplicants of Cheltenham 
had begun to ask, what would happen if the one day the Americans decided not to be 
quite so accommodating? 
 
The result was a planned UK sigint satellite codename 'Zircon', budgeted at £100 million, 
but given the UK's inglorious record in the realm of space, it would probably have cost 
more. Eventually the plan was uncovered and then abandoned on cost grounds, with 
Whitehall opting to lease American satellites on a timeshare basis. Of course, the story of 
Zircon has been told elsewhere and is often portrayed as an effort to stabilise the Anglo-
American intelligence relationship. However when viewed in the context of the Falklands 
campaign, one wonders whether this is the full story.6
 
In 1982, Britain's European allies rallied to her cause quicker than the Americans.7 The 
Defence Secretary, John Nott is quoted in this study as asserting that: 'In so many ways 
Mitterand and the French were our greatest allies' (vol.II, p71). This included signals 
intelligence. Recent revelations suggest that sigint from French Guyana, and also from 
the Dutch site at Eemnes, was important in assisting the British effort. So one of the 
fascinating questions raised by the aftermath of the Falklands is whether ZIRCON was 
really an effort to shore up the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, or whether it 
was an attempt to either 'going it alone' or else diversify by building up stronger 
European intelligence partnerships.8  
 
Freedman's chapter on American support has remarkably little to say about intelligence. 
Moreover his analysis of the Falklands campaign lacks any overall assessment of the  
texture of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship during the early 1980s. To what 
extent did this relationship provide a 'special bond' of the type so often celebrated - even 
evangelised - in some academic literature. Alternatively, to what extent did it represent 
something more calculating? Put another way, was this relationship an expression of 
liberal institutionalism, of shared democratic ideals and long-established habits of 
working together. Or else had sentimentality evaporated by the last decade of the Cold 
War, revealing a certain realpolitik?9  
 
The humble unofficial historian has little to go on here. Recently, UK file releases from 
the Ministry of Defence have slowed to a trickle and so it is hard to probe events after 
1970.10 However, the limited evidence now extant suggests that the attitude was more 
hard-nosed bargaining rather than bonhomie. In August 1975, some British diplomats had 
been asking why the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) spent so much time collecting 
information on subjects of no earthly interest to the UK, which sometimes led to 
collection operations that were 'ill-advised'. PUSD defended the DIS and interjected that 
this was often gathered to please the Americans and was intended to offset the vast 
amount of material that they provided to the UK. They observed that intelligence 
exchange was 'the last bastion' of the special relationship, adding that it 'gives us an 
entrée to American political thinking in a way that no other country is able to benefit.' In 
short, the Anglo-American intelligence relationship also provided a window on 
Washington. One presumes that such America-watching must have been a big factor 
during the Falklands Campaign.11 America-watching has since become a growing 
activity for all American allies.12    
 
 
Deception and Special Forces 
Intelligence is not a distinct subject, but merges seamlessly with deception, psychological 
warfare and special operations. One post-war intelligence chief remarked that intelligence 
is normally a 'Cinderella service' - and it is war that 'changes Cinderella into the Princess'. 
This is perhaps even more true of deception, which remains relatively inactive until cover 
is required for military operations. After 1945, the UK had taken unusual care to preserve 
a strategic deception infrastructure. This was distilled into a small organisation, the 
Department of Forward Plans under John Drew, which also undertook psychological 
warfare.13  A descendant called Special Projects Group carried out planning for these 
activities in 1982.  
 
During the Falklands campaign, deception planning, although innovative, tended to cut 
across operational objectives. Initial plans to persuade the Argentinean Navy to run for 
port by exaggerating strengths ran foul of a desire to draw them out to sea. There were 
also the historic difficulties that have always dogged deception. The main conduit for 
transferring false information to the enemy was leaks to the press. Did Whitehall want to 
'poison the well' by deliberately planting false information in newspapers, something 
which would eventually come to light? The question does not appear to have been 
resolved. Other aspects resonate down the years. The scale of resources for psychological 
operations in-theatre were pitiful, as they have been in every British campaign both 
before and since (vol.II, pp.410-14). 
 
By the 1990s the Ministry of Defence had discovered - to its chagrin - that many SAS 
veterans were writing books, inspired in part by the literary endeavours of Sir Peter de la 
Billiere.14 Accordingly, we have several accounts of the Falklands by SAS veterans to 
compare with this history.  One of the most famous escapades was an SAS mission to 
sabotage an Argentine airbase. The War Cabinet, concerned that Royal Naval ships were 
vulnerable to Super Etendard bombers equipped with Exocet missiles, changed the rules 
of engagement to allow some activity on the mainland. It was proposed that special 
forces should undertake an intelligence-gathering mission, followed by an Entebbe-style 
raid on the Super Etendards at the Rio Grande airbase in Tierra del Fuego.  Codenamed 
Operation Mikado, the SAS got cold feet and soon came to refer to this as Operation 
Certain Death. An SAS reconnaissance party in a RN helicopter took off on 17 May, but 
bad weather and low fuel forced it to land 50 miles from its target. Here the mission was 
aborted and it is often asserted that the RN helicopter crew was abandoned by the SAS 
troopers who scurried for the Chilean border. Meanwhile other SAS units had reportedly 
refused to carry out the main raid. Alas, Freedman sheds no light on these rather 
intriguing issues.15   
 
Freedman prefers the strategic to the tactical, and so is better on the command problems 
of integrating irregular elements into a regular campaign. Special forces were given a 
number of traditional roles to which they were ideally suited, not least the destruction of 
local air power through a successful raid on the Argentine airfield at Pebble Island. 
However, they also fulfilled another traditional role, that of irritating senior officers by 
ignoring normal command structures. There were other problems. Too few regular 
officers understood what special forces could and could not do, meanwhile the plethora 
of special forces resulted in continual pressure to use them, producing some attacks and 
operations that were of marginal value (vol.II, p.729). 
 Command and control special forces - and indeed intelligence assets - within military 
theatres of command has great contemporary significance and has spawned its own 
theological literature. Like so many of the lessons draw out by Freedman - including the 
procedures for interrogation of POWs - these matters are never more pertinent than now. 
Indeed his most telling observation is his conclusion that while the Falklands campaign 
'stands out as an anomaly in recent international history, the last war of a past imperial 
era … it can now be recognised as one of the first of the coming post cold-war era' 
(vol.II, p.747). He is surely right. Accordingly, while the intelligence dimension is 
limited, nevertheless, Freedman will be required reading and contains much that is of 
more than mere historical interest.  
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